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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN D. PAUL and ANITA K. PAUL, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
MABLE S. KITT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 13968 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS LYNN D. PAUL AND ANITA K. PAUL 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, as Buyers, brought suit for specific 
performance against Defendant-Appellant, as Seller, for breach 
of a real estate sales contract and for attorneys fees. Defendant-
Appellant, the Seller, counterclaimed alleging default and fraud, 
and mailed a notice as basis for unlawful detainer or forfeiture. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE TRIAL COURT 
Judgment was entered in favor of the Buyers directing 
specific performance of the contract by the Seller and awarding 
the Buyers $500.00 damages for attorneys fees incurred. The damages Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
were credited on the contract payments. The counterclaim was dis~ ! 
missed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
i 
Plaintiffs-Respondents request the judgment of the trial 
i 
court be affirmed. 
MEMORANDUM 
References to "Tr." pertain to the numbered pages in the 
transcript. References to "R." pertain to the indicated pages of 
record. References to Plaintiff's exhibits are shown by "P-" and 
Defendant's exhibits are shown by "D-" preceding the number of the 
exhibit. 
• * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 7, 1972, the Plaintiffs-Respondents in this 
action, herein referred to as Buyers, executed a contract to pur-
chase real estate from the Defendant-Appellant and her then-living 
husband, John Maynard Kitt, herein referred to as Seller (Ex. P-10). 
This contract required a down-payment of $480.00 with $50.00 or 
more to be paid on or before the first day of each month succeeding 
April 1, 1972. The payments were to be applied first to interest 
and subsequently to principal. Payments were made by the Buyers 
and accepted by the Seller until March 25, 1974, at which time the 
Buyers mailed the March payment in the form of a money order on the 
Bank of Salt Lake No. 35775 (Ex. P-l and Tr. 41). Said payment, 
though late by 25 days* was mailed within the 30-day period allowed Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
under Paragraph 16 of the aforementioned contract. This money order 
was mailed to Mable Kitt, 7821 South 3500 East at Sandy, Utah, or 
Salt Lake City, Utah, which City was uncertain. The January and 
February, 1974, payments were addressed to Mable Kitt, 7321 South 
3500 East, Sandy, Utah, and were delivered (Tr. 21 and Ex. D-24 and 
D-25). In either case, the correct street and number of 7821 South 
3500 East were used. Apparently, in such cases, the post office 
either returns the letter to the sender or corrects the Sandy City 
to read Salt Lake City and then delivers the letter (Tr. 21). 
Defendant-Appellant claims this money order was never 
received by her. On April 3, 1974, the Seller sent a letter to the 
Buyers which stated she terminated the contract and repossessed 
the lot. Said letter states: 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
April 3, 1974 
Mr. Lynn and Anita Paul: 
I hereby notify you of the termination of 
your contract on Lot 204, Honeywood Hills II, 
for lack of payment on same. 
I am taking possession of said Lot under 
Option One of the contract you signed. Refer 
to your contract for information. 
Respectfully yours, 
Mable S. Kitt 
7821 South 3500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
LaRhea Kitt Walton 
Linda Spencer Kitt 
(Ex. P-ll) 
This letter was received by Plaintiffs-Respondents on 
April 4, 1974 (Ex. D-26). 
On Friday, April 5, 1974, Buyers purchased a $50.00 money 
order No. 36892 (Ex. P-5). This money order was apparently mailed 
Anri l Q. 1Q74 fFv P-l(^_ hut WAC rt*tnirnar\ t n tho Rn\/o^c AnMl 11 
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1974, by the post office marked "Return to Sender." 
On April 16, 1974, Buyers1 attorney remailed the April 5th 
money order to the Seller by certified mail properly addressed (Ex. 
P-18). Included with the money order was a letter which explained 
the loss of the March 25th payment plus the fact that a tracer on 
the lost payment was being placed by the post office. The letter 
states in part, "If-the money order cannot be found, they will have 
the bank stop-payment and will issue a duplicate payment to you by 
the end of April, 1974" (Ex. P-18). This payment was returned by 
the Seller. -
On May 1, 1974, Plaintiffs-Respondents1 counsel mailed 
Defendant-Appellant two $50.00 money orders. Honey Order No. 37124 
was a replacement for the lost money order dated March 25th (Ex. P-4). 
Money Order No. 37116 was intended to be the Hay, 1974, installment 
(Ex. P-7). Included with these two payments was a letter from the 
Buyers1 counsel which states in part, "Mr. and Mrs. Lynn Paul here-
with offer to pay the net balance of the contract in exchange for a 
warranty deed'1 (Ex. P-19). 
On May 31, 1974, another Money Order Mo. 37406 (Ex. P-9) was 
purchased and sent to Mrs. Kitt properly addressed. Each money order 
mentioned was returned to Buyers by the Seller as soon as it was 
received except the May 31st money order which was returned to the 
Court by the Seller at the time of the hearing. 
On May 17, 1974, Buyers filed suit for specific performance, 
and Seller counterclaimed for cancellation of the purchase contract 
or presumably an unlawful detainer counterclaim and for fraud. The 
trial court, Judge James S. Sawaya, decreed specific performance, 
awarded attorneys fees, and dismissed the counterclaim. Seller 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO 
DIRECT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. 
Buyers were not in default at the time Seller sent a notice 
of termination of the contract. Buyers had purchased and mailed on 
March 25, 1974, a money order for the March installment. The receipt 
issued by the bank for said money order was admitted into evidence and 
the testimony concerning the fact that it was mailed was uncontroverted. 
Use of the mail for payments was the accepted custom (Tr. 33). 
March 25th was within the 30-day period allowed by the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract under Paragraph 16. Seller contends that this in-
stallment was never received by her. As a result, from her point of 
view, it may have appeared that a default had occurred, thus her 
concern is understandable. What cannot be understood is the belligerant 
attitude taken by the Seller after she had received not only an ex-
planation of the lost payment but the assurance that a duplicate would 
be issued no later than the end of April, 1974, if the lost payment 
were not found by then. In the meantime, all payments were kept 
current. 
The Buyers testified that their relations with the Seller 
were amicable. This seems to be confirmed by the testimony of Mrs. 
Kitt concerning a delinquency which occurred in November and December, 
1973 (Tr. 62-63). This testimony indicates an amicable attitude 
between the parties. The Seller accepted those two late payments, 
which indicated Seller would not be so technically strict. 
Acceptance of late installment payments without termina-
tion of the purchaser's rights under the contract has been considered 
iA»i\/flv» n*f -f-ho \/onHny*'c *»"inh* t n H o r l a r o a -Pnr-Fpituro horanco n f 
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default in timely payments, at least in the absence of reasonable f 
i 
notice that the vendor would thereafter demand strict compliance 
with the terms of the contract. 55 A.L.R. (3d) 39. | 
Hill v. Taylor, (1970) 285 Ala. 612, 235 So. (2d) 647. ' . 
In this case the court held that the failure of the purchaser to 
make a monthly payment on time did not justify a determination that I 
the delayed tender of installment constituted a default or work a 
forfeiture. I 
In the case of Kings ley v. Roeder, (1954) 2 111. (2d) 131, I 
117 N.E. (2d) 82, the court took the position that once the seller 
had waived the provisions as to strict compliance with the payment 
requirements they were required to give the purchaser adequate advance 
notice that strict compliance with the payment requirements would • 
henceforth be requiredi and that where the sellers made no diligent I 
effort to serve such a notice upon the purchasers, they were precluded 
from declaring the contract forfeited by the mere fact that the | 
installment payments were sent a month or two late. . 
It is common knowledge that the street numbering system ' 
1n the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area uses South Temple and Main Street I 
as the central point and basically the streets are numbered with 
reference to this point, quite like the geological survey system of -| 
designating Township and Range (i.e., T2S, R3E, etc.). The suburbs i 
around Salt Lake City proper are not well defined by boundary, but 
an address such as 7821 South 3500 East is significant to the post 
office, especially with the zip code 04121 added (Ex. P-25). 
Since any delay caused by addressing to "Sandy" could only I 
result in potential problems, no rational motivation, such as Seller | 
claiming an intentional delay, can be imputed to Buyers. There Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and Sandy City (Tr. 20)- This type of mistake or inadvertence 
does not attain the degree of gravity to justify an inequitable 
forfeiture for a possible "technical default" on a contract. This 
is especially true in view of the promise to issue a duplicate 
money order at the end of April should the lost installment not be 
found* 
Under the extenuating circumstances of the case at bar, 
it would be unconscionable to adjudge a forfeiture. This court has 
announced the equitable policy or rule in Utah as follows: 
Weyher v. Peterson, (1965) 16 U.2d 278, 399 P.2d 
438. By common practice in Utah, an action in 
unlawful detainer may be brought against a vendee 
of realty v/hen payments are far in arrears, after 
sufficient demands for payment have been made and 
subsequent notice to quit has been given by the 
vendor; and where a vendor does cancel the con-
tract for sale and bring such an action, vendee 
may be required, if the contract so provides, 
to forfeit as liquidated damages all money there-
tofore paid to the vendor along with all improve-
ments placed on the land by the vendee, unless 
such forfeiture would be unconscionable. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Seller claims that at no time did the Buyers tender more 
than a portion of the delinquency, yet Mrs. Kitt said she would 
not have accepted three payments at one time (Tr. 63-64). When the 
April 5th payment was mailed while the March 25th installment was 
still lost, the contract may be considered current by applying that 
payment for March. The Seller v/as given a full explanation and 
Buyers promised to issue a duplicate March payment. In view of the 
facts, Buyers were taking reasonable precautions to protect the lost 
payment. Since Seller assumes nothing but the worst of intentions 
on the part of the Buyers, conversely, the Buyers might legitimately 
be allowed to assume that the lost payment had been received by Mrs. 
Kitt who simply refused to cash it in order to establish a phony Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
justification for repossession of the lot (Tr. 51-52). In view of 
this possibility, Mr. and Mrs. Paul acted reasonably in taking the 
precautions they did. Once the tracer did not find the lost payment, 
a duplicate was issued. 
By the end of April or first of May, 1974, Seller was in 
receipt of all "delinquencies." No effort was made to retender for 
the third time the rejected April 5th payment (Ex. P-8) which was 
last mailed on April 16, 1974 (Tr. 63). It was at this time that 
the offer to pay the remaining balance on the contract was made in 
lieu of retendering the rejected April payment. 
Defendant-Appellant cites Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 U. 
2d 47,513 P.2d 417 (1973), for the proposition that the Seller is 
entitled to have delinquencies paid in full. In the case at bar, 
the Buyers tendered the "delinquent" payments during April and May 
(Tr. 41, 42, 43). 
The central issue in Corporation Nine was whether prior 
deviations by both parties from a plan of sale established in a 
contract for sale of land justified later deviations from the con-
tract. Because of the deviation, the Buyer simply stood upon the 
position that it had tendered full performance. This ^ tender and 
refusal was the heart of the controversy. 
The Buyer in Corporation Nine cited the following cases, 
and Plaintiffs-Respondents in the case at bar also invite the Court's 
attention to these cases for the principle that forfeitures are not 
favored: Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P. 2d 673 (1971); 
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P. 2d 446 (1952); Malmberg v. 
Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218 P. 975 (1923). 
The Court then made this comment: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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We agree that in the situation of the usual real 
estate contract, and perhaps even in this one, 
the five day notice to perform might be un-
reasonable and arbitrary if a more reasonable 
and longer time would have been of any benefit 
to the buyer. 
Defendant-Appellant cites Fuhriman v. Bissegger, 13 U. 
2d 379, 375 P. 2d 27 (1962), for the proposition that the purchaser 
must pay all amounts due into the court. Such method of payment 
is only one possible consideration for a given case. The court 
did not infer that this method must be used in all cases. The 
court might just as easily have ordered payments to be made to an 
escrow, as Buyers in the case at bar suggested at the conclusion 
of the trial. Since there is more than one equitable method to 
remedy controversies of this nature, the Fuhriman case certainly 
does not hold that the money must be paid in to the Court in all 
cases as the condition for specific performance. 
POINT II 
THE NOTICE SENT TO PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS BY DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT IS WHOLLY INADEQUATE. 
Accepting Seller's argument that Buyers were in default, 
simply for the sake of discussion, it can be seen that the April 3rd 
notice sent to Buyers is wholly inadequate for the purpose intended. 
It does not give the Buyers a reasonable chance to inquire into the 
alleged default nor does it give five days to correct an alleged 
default. The letter states definitively that Seller has terminated 
the contract and is taking possession. It is implied that the 
reference to the contract contained in the letter speaks indirectly 
to the five-day period in which to remedy. This argument is countered 
by the unequivocal statement that the contract is terminated. 
However, a $50.00 payment (money order) (Ex. P-3) was obtained on 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Friday, April 5th* and mailed April 9, 1974. 
In the case of Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, (1943) 113 
U. 403, 195 P. 2d 743, this Court held that acceptance by vendor 
of purchaser's past due payments under a uniform real estate con-
tract, and other conduct leading the Buyer to believe that strict 
performance would not be required by vendor, imposes a duty on 
vendor to give purchaser a reasonable notice before vendor may 
insist on strict performance by purchaser. 
Defendant-Appellant, by way of an inaccurate citation, 
cites the case of Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P. 2d 699 (1934). 
It is felt that this case is distinguishable from the case at bar 
for several reasons. First, there was no question as to the Buyer's 
default in that case. The default existed and was not challenged. 
Second, the central issue in that case, contrary to the case at 
bar, was whether the forfeiture clause contained in the land sale 
contract was self-executing or not. If the clause stated that Buyer's 
default made the contract null and void, then no notice of an election 
of forfeiture need be sent by the seller to the buyer. In other 
words, the contract would be self-executing. As is stated in 94 
A.L.R. 1232, at 1245, no such notice is necessary in the absence 
of a statute requiring such, unless the contract is to be interpreted 
as requiring it. In speaking of the Leone case in particular, the 
annotation explains that the contract there in question did not pro-
vide for the giving of written notice of forfeiture. It did say, 
however, that the vendor uat his option" could respond to a default 
in several different ways- The Court held that until the vendor 
exercises his election to forfeit by notice given to the vendee a 
suit for forfeiture and possession by the vendor would not lie. 
— •. _ /s ±. . j .
 A _ 4.^ ^v^»>1^4« +>hA nnv*nr»ea o f Ciirh nnt i rP a§ ClivinCI 
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the vendee an explanation of what result his default would have, 
since the contract itself did not give such an explanation. The 
Court was aided in its decision by the unlawful detainer statute 1n 
force at that time (R.S. Utah 1933, 104-60-3). This statute varies 
greatly from that presently in effect, which constitutes another 
distinction between the two cases. The final distinction stems from 
the fact that a uniform real estate contract was not involved there 
as it Is in the case presented now. (Emphasis added.) 
In the Fuhriman case (supra) cited by Seller, the Court 
recognized the right of a purchaser under an installment land con-
tract to specific performance notwithstanding default in timely 
payment of installments. The decision v/as based upon a determination 
"that forfeiture of the purchaser's rights was barred by the failure 
of the vendor to comply with provision of the contract ... governing 
notice requirements with respect to termination and forfeiture of the 
rights of the purchaser." 
In the Fuhriman case, the purchaser had defaulted in making 
payments on a contract for the sale of real estate for many years. 
An action was brought by the vendor to evict under a clause like 
Paragraph 16a in the contract at bar. Purchaser counterclaimed for 
specific performance. The Court held, in part, that vendor had failed 
to notify purchaser that unless payments were made within a reasonable 
time, there would be a forfeiture of the agreement. Just as in the 
case at bar, Seller tried repossession without a notice of the time 
period to remedy the default. 
POINT III 
THE DAMAGE AWARD IS REASONABLE AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Defendant-Appellant cites F.M.A. Financial Corporation 
v. Build, Inc., 17 U. 2d 80, 404 P. 2d 670 (1965), for the proposition 
that damages or attorneys fees must be supported by evidence and 
not a promise to pay an attorney. In the case at bar, testimony 
was given as to the obligation which Plaintiffs-Respondents incurred 
to their attorney as a result of the actions taken by Mrs. Kitt 
(Tr. 44-45). The case cited states that attorneys fees to the 
Plaintiffs were awarded "without an^ evidence or stipulation in 
the record with respect thereto." 
The attempt was made in the last cited case to justify 
the award by an "advisory schedule of fees and charges" only. The 
reason for the Supreme Court's holding denying attorneys fees is 
obvious and distinguishable from the case at bar. At no point does 
that case state that a promise to pay an attorney given as testimony 
in open court is insufficient evidence of such item of damages. 
There was no contention in our case that the fee was unreasonable. 
The trial court in the case at bar found from the evidence (Tr. 44) 
and not from a suggested schedule of fees that the Pauls had incurred 
$500.00 attorneys fees and awarded this as damages (R. 34, Para. 4) 
(R. 44, Para. 2). 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court properly 
ordered specific performance and denied the counterclaim; that said 
judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Gregory C Diamond 
George C. Morris 
, ,••»••-•. <?.. MORRIS S ROBINSON 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
801 328-2553 
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